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We study the statistical properties of the attendance time series corresponding to the number of
agents making a particular decision in the minority game (MG). We focus on the analysis of the
probability distribution and the autocorrelation function of the attendance over a time interval in
the efficient phase of the game. In this regime both the probability distribution and the autocorre-
lation function are shown to have similar behaviour for time differences corresponding to multiples
of 2 · 2m, which is twice the number of possible history bit strings in a MG with agents making
decisions based on the most recent m outcomes of the game.
The minority game (MG), introduced by Challet and
Zheng [1], represents a simplified version of the El Farol
bar-attendance problem [2–4] proposed by Arthur. It
gives perhaps the simplest model of a complex adap-
tive system [5] in which agents of similar capability are
competing to be in the minority based on some globally
shared information. The model may be useful in investi-
gating many of the features observed in financial markets
[6,7]. In its basic form, the MG describes a system (mar-
ket) in which an odd number N of agents are allowed to
make two possible choices in each turn. At each step,
agents have to choose either to be in side 0 (buying) or
side 1 (selling). After every agent has independently cho-
sen a side, the side with fewer agents (the minority side)
is identified as the winning side. The “output” of each
time step can be represented by a single binary digit: 0
for side 0 winning, and 1 for side 1 winning. The record
of the outputs for the last m steps is the only informa-
tion given to all agents based on which each agent is to
decide which side to take in the next time step. There-
fore, there are a total of 2m possible historym-bit strings.
The whole strategy space thus consists of 22
m
strategies.
The number of strategies grows rapidly with m. For-
tunately, it has been pointed out [8,9] that a reduced
strategy space consisting of 2m pairs of mutually anti-
correlated strategies, thus having a total of 2 · 2m strate-
gies, is sufficient to represent the full strategy space. In
the beginning of the game, each agent randomly picks s
strategies, with repetitions allowed. After each step, each
agent assigns (deducts) one (virtual) point to each of his
strategies which would have predicted the correct (incor-
rect) output. At a given time step, each agent decides
based on the prediction of the most successful strategy
in his bag of s strategies. The past history thus creates a
feedback mechanism that leads to adaptivity in the pop-
ulation.
The MG and some of its variations have been the sub-
ject of much recent attention [10–16]. One of the most
important features in the MG is that the average stan-
dard deviation σ of the attendance time series in any one
of the two sides over different runs in computer simula-
tions could drop to values better than the case in which
agents’ decisions are made randomly. For small s, σ has
a minimum as a function of m [1,9]. If the number of
strategies in the reduced strategy space is small com-
pared to the total number of agents, i.e., 2 · 2m ≪ N · s,
many agents tend to use the same strategy at any given
time step and hence make the same decision. They form
a “crowd” that leads to the large standard deviation in
the statistics of the attendance. This regime is refereed
to as the efficient phase since the agents cannot make use
of the information hidden in the history bit-string as hid-
den information lies in strings longer than m [9,17]. In
the large m limit, the strategy pool is much larger than
the number of strategies actually in play. The agents are
essentially making independent decisions randomly, lead-
ing to σ ∼
√
N/2 in this random-coin-toss limit. The
minimum in σ occurs near 2 · 2m ∼ N · s in which there
are about the same numbers of agents playing a strategy
(forming a crowd) and its anticorrelated partner (forming
an anti-crowd) [18,19]. It has been found that the MG
has very rich statistical features in the efficient regime
[17].
In this work, we focus on the changes in the attendance
time series of the MG in the efficient regime. Analo-
gous to the statistical analysis of the log-return in finan-
cial time series, we study the statistics of the logarith-
mic changes in the attendance time series of MG. We
also study the autocorrelation function of the logarith-
mic change time series.
For a given time series of the number of agents N0(t)
making a particular choice, say taking side 0, in the MG,
we construct the time series of the successive differences
of the natural logarithm of the number of attendance as
[20]
G∆t(t) = lnN0(t+∆t)− lnN0(t), (1)
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where ∆t is the sampling time interval. Such time series
of logarithmic changes in prices have been extensively
studied in the context of econophysics [21]. A time se-
ries can be constructed for a given ∆t. First we look
into the statistics of the values of G∆t(t) for given ∆t.
Figure 1 shows the probability distribution P of G∆t(t)
for ∆t = 1, 5, and 8 for the case of N = 1001, s = 2
and m = 2. All results are averaged over 32 independent
runs. Note that the probability distributions for ∆t = 1
and ∆t = 5 show very clear multi-peak structures, while
for ∆t = 8, the peak corresponding to zero-return dom-
inates. Our results for ∆t = 1 are consistent with those
in Ref. [17]. In Ref. [17], a plot of N0(t+1) against N0(t)
was constructed. It was found that the plot consists of
patches reminiscence of attractors in a map. The exis-
tence of patches implies the existence of dominant values
in G∆t=1(t) as shown in Fig.1(a). It is related to the vir-
tual point assignments through which the performance
of the strategies are rated and the limited adaptability
of the agents imposed by a small value of s. The present
work hence represents an extension of the study in Ref.
[17] to other values of ∆t and investigate the interesting
pheneomena of a periodicity of 2 · 2m in time series in
MG. The results in Fig.1(b) imply that similar patches
also appear in the N0(t+ 5) against N0(t) plot, which is
given in Fig.2(a). The plot is averaged over different runs
and different return maps with different initial time t. For
∆t = 8, the sharp peak for zero returns implies the forma-
tion of patches concentrated among the diagonal in a plot
of N0(t+ 8) against N0(t) plot (see Fig. 2(b)). We note
that the separate return map plotting non-overlapping
data given by N0(t), N0(t+8), N0(t+16), · · · cover only
a few patches in Fig.2(b) for given initial value t. After
investigating the distribution for higher values of ∆t, we
found that the probability distribution corresponding to
a given ∆t is identical to that corresponding to ∆t+2·2m.
Thus the probability distributions show identical features
for different values of ∆t which are separated by multi-
ples of 2 · 2m. For m = 2, it implies that P for ∆t = 9 is
identical to that in Fig.1 (a) for ∆t = 1. Similar proper-
ties are also observed for m = 3 and other values of m in
the efficient phase for small values of s. Figure 3 shows
the probability of zero return R, which corresponds to
the value of the zero-return peak in Fig.1, as a function
of ∆t for m = 2 and m = 3. It is observed that values for
different values of ∆t which are multiples of 2 · 2m apart
are nearly identical. The sharp peaks at ∆t = n · 2 · 2m,
where n is a positive integer, reflect the dominant peak
in the probability distribution for ∆t = 8 (see Fig.1(c)).
Similarly for m = 3, sharp peaks appear at ∆t equal to
multiples of 2 · 2m = 16 (see Fig.3(b)).
It is also interesting to look at the autocorrelation func-
tion of the log-return time series. For ∆t = 1, the auto-
correlation C(k) of G1(t) is
C(k) =
< G1(t)G1(t+ k) > − < G1(t) >2
< G2
1
(t) > − < G1(t) >2
, (2)
where k is called the time lag. The averages < · · · > are
taken over the time series. Figure 4 shows the autocorre-
lation function for m = 2 and m = 3. Again, periodicity
of 2 · 2m is evidence.
The statistics of the time series G∆t(t) of logarithmic
changes in the number of agents making a particular de-
cision in the MG show interesting statistically periodic
features with period T = 2 · 2m in the efficient regime.
The period T = 2 · 2m turns out to be twice the num-
ber of possible history bit-strings in a game of given m.
The observation can be understood qualitatively as the
system goes back to a similar situation only after multi-
ples of 2 · 2m time steps [9,22]. Imagine in the beginning
of the game, each agent when encountering a particular
history will choose a strategy at random in making the
decision as the virtual points are all equal in the begin-
ning. After the outcome is made known, the strategies
which gave the correct prediction gain one point. As-
suming the game visits each possible m-bit history with
equal probability, the particular history bit-string will
be encountered about 2m time steps later as there are
2m possible history bit-strings. At this time, the agents
holding the strategies which predicted correctly in the
previous occurrence of the history would make the same
decision and due to overcrowding they will lose. Virtual
points will then be deducted from these strategies and
virtual points will be assigned to the other strategies.
After about another 2m time steps, the history will be
encountered again. This time all the startegies have sim-
ilar virtual points and the situation is back to that in the
beginning of the game, hence leading to the observation
of similar behaviour in the statistics of G∆t(t) for ∆t dif-
fers by multiples of 2 · 2m. The periodic behaviour hence
is a result of the interplay between the memory m of
the agents and the limited adaptability when s is small.
Difference in the behaviour of the game for a particu-
lar history having occurred an odd number and an even
number of times has been discussed within the context
of strategy selections in MG [22].
The behaviour is also related to the features in the
statistics of the occurrence of bit-strings of various
lengths in the history, which is a binary series. Close
observation on the occurrence of history bit-strings of
length m reveals the same periodic behaviour in that
the history occurrence almost repeats itself every 2 · 2m
turns when s is small, i.e. when the agents have limited
adaptability. The periodicity is, however, too long for the
agents with memory m to spot it. For larger values of
s, the periodic behaviour become less obvious. Similarly,
it has been pointed out that [9] for MG in the efficient
regime, bit-strings of lengthm+1 or shorter occurs evenly
while bit-strings of length k > m+1 occurs unevenly. For
m = 2, s = 2, and N = 1001, uneven bit-strings distri-
bution arises for k ≥ 4. Interestingly, for k = 2 · 2m = 8,
it is found that the string 11101000 and 11100010 and
their permutations dominate the bit-string distribution.
It is consistent with the even distribution for k ≤ 3 as
these particular 8-bit strings contain all the possible 3-
bit strings. In fact, given that the bit-strings must occur
2
uniformly upto kmax = 3 and there is some periodicity
in longer bit-string, the shortest length that is compat-
ible with the requirement is 2kmax = 8. For kmax = 3,
the total number of different 3-bit history strings is 8.
The bit-string with the shortest length that contains all
the eight 3-bit strings once must be of length 8. This
result reveals one more time the embedded periodicity of
2 · 2m in the MG in the efficient regime when the agents’
adaptability is limited. For large m, the strategy pool
is huge and the game approaches the random coin-toss
limit in which the agents are efficiently choosing a deci-
sion at random in each turn. In this case, the multi-peak
structure in the probability distribution of G∆t(t) will no
longer persist.
In summary, we have studied the statistics of the time
series of the successive differences of the natural loga-
rithm of the number of attendance in MG. Interesting
behaviour with a period doubling that of the number
of possible history bit-strings in the efficient regime are
pointed out.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Probability distribution of G∆t(t) for N =
1001, m = 2 and s = 2 with (a) ∆t = 1; (b) ∆t = 5;
and (c) ∆t = 8.
Figure 2: (a) The plot of N0(t + 5) against N0(t). (b)
The plot of N0(t+ 8) against N0(t).
Figure 3: The probability of zero return R as a function
of ∆t for N = 1001 and s = 2 with (a) m = 2 and (b)
m = 3.
Figure 4: The autocorrelation function C(k) as a function
of k for N = 1001 and s = 2, with (a) m = 2 and (b)
m = 3.
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